

SMART CONTRACT

Security Audit Report

Customer:	Mad Viking Games
Website:	madvikinggames.com
Platform:	VeChainThor
Language:	Solidity
Date:	August 30th, 2021

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Introduction

EtherAuthority was contracted by the MVG team to perform the Security audit of the MVG Token smart contract code. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on August 30th, 2021.

The purpose of this audit was to address the following:

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

Project Background

MVG (MVG) is a VIP-180 standard token contract on the VeChainThor blockchain. MVG Token is at the backbone of the Mad Viking Games, which creates a future-oriented ecosystem where people from all over the world can interact with a low transaction fee, enabling an extremely liberating, strategic and seamless trading experience in a decentralized way.

Audit scope

Name	Code Review and Security Analysis Report for MVG Token Smart Contract
Platform	VeChainThor / Solidity
File 1	mvg.sol
File 1 MD5 Hash	6749170CE3923BC9A137227E09FB52EA
File 2	vip-180.sol
File 2 MD5 Hash	7A71DC078B09D406D21F0220EE955D70
File 3	ivip-180.sol
File 3 MD5 Hash	212C608AC71BF5FCA5BE685BC441624B
File 4	safe-math.sol
File 4 MD5 Hash	000CE0729802CE2EF2C76EC92AE1B7A8
Audit Date	August 30th, 2021

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Claimed Smart Contract Features

Claimed Feature Detail	Our Observation
Tokenomics: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Name: MVG• Symbol: MVG• Decimals: 18• Total Supply: 100 Billion• Type: VIP-180• Platform: VeChainThor	YES, This is valid.
100 Billion tokens will be minted and sent to the contract creator at the time of contract deployment. New tokens can never be minted	YES, This is valid.
There is no contract creator / owner's control, which makes MVG token fully decentralized.	YES, This is valid.

Audit Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer's solidity smart contracts are **"Well Secured"**. This token contract does not contain any owner control, making it fully decentralized.



You are here

We used various tools like Slither, Solhint and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium and 1 low and some very low level issues.

Investors Advice: Technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

Technical Quick Stats

Main Category	Subcategory	Result
Contract Programming	Solidity version not specified	Passed
	Solidity version too old	Moderated
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack of check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Passed
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	Passed
	Fallback function misuse	Passed
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Features claimed	Passed
	Other programming issues	Passed
Code Specification	Function visibility not explicitly declared	Passed
	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Unused code	Moderated
Gas Optimization	"Out of Gas" Issue	Passed
	High consumption 'for/while' loop	Passed
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	Assert() misuse	Passed
Business Risk	The maximum limit for mintage not set	Passed
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

Overall Audit Result: **PASSED**

Code Quality

This audit scope has 4 smart contract files. Smart contracts also contain Libraries, Smart contracts inherits and Interfaces. These are compact and well written contracts.

The libraries in MVG are part of its logical algorithm. A library is a different type of smart contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only once), it is assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can be reused many times by other contracts in the MVG token.

The MVG Token team has **not** provided scenario and unit test scripts, which would have helped to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Code parts are **well** commented on smart contracts.

Documentation

We were given a MVG smart contracts code in the form of a gitfront.io web link. The hashes of that code are mentioned above in the table.

As mentioned above, code parts are **well** commented. So it is easy to quickly understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic. Comments are very helpful in understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

Another source of information was its official website <http://madvikinggames.com> which provided rich information about the project architecture and tokenomics.

Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contract infrastructure that are based on well known industry standard open source projects. And their core code blocks are written well.

Apart from libraries, its functions are not used in external smart contract calls.

AS-IS overview

(1) Interface

- (a) IVIP180

(2) Inherited contracts

- (a) VIP180
- (b) IVIP180

(3) Usages

- (a) using SafeMath for uint256

(4) Events

- (a) event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);
- (b) event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);

(5) Functions

Sl.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	name	read	Passed	No Issue
3	symbol	read	Passed	No Issue
4	decimals	read	Passed	No Issue
5	totalSupply	read	Passed	No Issue
6	balanceOf	read	Passed	No Issue
7	transfer	write	Passed	No Issue
8	allowance	read	Passed	No Issue
9	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
10	transferFrom	write	Passed	No Issue
11	increaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
12	decreaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
13	transfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
14	_mint	internal	Passed	No Issue
15	approve	internal	Passed	No Issue

Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

Audit Findings

Critical

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

High

No High severity vulnerabilities were found.

Medium

No Medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

Low

(1) Code lines ordering

```
function transferFrom(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) public returns  
    _transfer(sender, recipient, amount);  
    _approve(sender, msg.sender, _allowances[sender][msg.sender].sub(amount, "VIP180: tr  
    return true;  
}
```

In the transferFrom() function, we suggest putting _approve() first and then _transfer(). The reason is that if a transaction is reverted due to lack of an allowance, then it will run _transfer() and consume more gas for the failed transactions.

Very Low / Informational / Best practices:

(1) Consider using the latest solidity compiler while deploying

```
pragma solidity ^0.5.0;
```

Although this does not create major security vulnerabilities, the latest solidity version has lots of improvements, so it's recommended to use the latest solidity version, which is 0.8.7 at the time of this audit.

(2) Make variables constant

```
string private _name;  
string private _symbol;  
uint8 private _decimals;
```

These variable's values will be unchanged. So, please make it constant. It will save some gas. Just put a constant keyword.

(3) Approve of ERC20 / VIP-180 standard:

To prevent attack vectors regarding approve() like the one described here:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YLPtQxZu1UAvO9cZ1O2RPXBbT0mooh4DYKjA_ip_RLM, clients SHOULD make sure to create user interfaces in such a way that they set the allowance first to 0 before setting it to another value for the same spender. THOUGH the contract itself shouldn't enforce it, to allow backwards compatibility with contracts deployed before

(4) All functions which are not called internally, must be declared as external. It is more efficient as sometimes it saves some gas.

<https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/19380/external-vs-public-best-practices>

(5) Unnecessary code:

The file `ivip-180.sol` has only event definitions, which is necessary. Other code parts are not needed. Although this does not raise any security issues, we recommend removing unnecessary code to make the smart contract clean.

Conclusion

We were given a contract code. And we have used all possible tests based on given objects as files. We observed some issues in the smart contracts and those issues are not critical ones. So, **it's good to go to production.**

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. Smart Contract's high level description of functionality was presented in As-is overview section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

Security state of the reviewed contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is **“Well Secured”**.

Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort. The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a particular line of investigation.

Vulnerability Analysis:

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high level understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

Documenting Results:

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

Disclaimers

EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer

EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

Due to the fact that the total number of test cases are unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

Appendix

Code Flow Diagram - MVG Token



Slither Results Log

Slither log >> mvg.sol

```
INFO:Detectors:
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#91-93) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256,string) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#109-116) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#129-131) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#147-150) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mul(uint256,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#66-78) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#34-36) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
INFO:Detectors:
Pragma version^0.5.0 (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#1) allows old versions
solc-0.5.12 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
INFO:Detectors:
totalSupply() should be declared external:
- VIP180.totalSupply() (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#174-176)
balanceOf(address) should be declared external:
- VIP180.balanceOf(address) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#181-183)
transfer(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- VIP180.transfer(address,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#193-196)
allowance(address,address) should be declared external:
- VIP180.allowance(address,address) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#201-203)
approve(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- VIP180.approve(address,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#212-215)
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- VIP180.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#229-233)
increaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- VIP180.increaseAllowance(address,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#247-250)
decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- VIP180.decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#266-269)
name() should be declared external:
- MVG.name() (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#355-357)
symbol() should be declared external:
- MVG.symbol() (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#363-365)
decimals() should be declared external:
- MVG.decimals() (../chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol#379-381)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
INFO:Slither:/chetan/gaza/mycontracts/mvg.sol analyzed (3 contracts with 75 detectors), 19 result(s) found
```

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Solidity static analysis

mvg.sol

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function `MVG.transfer` is infinite:
If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.
Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage
(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 193:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function `VIP180.transfer` is infinite:
If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.
Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage
(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 193:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function `MVG.approve` is infinite:
If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.
Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage
(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 212:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function `VIP180.increaseAllowance` is infinite:
If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.
Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage
(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 247:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function `MVG.decreaseAllowance` is infinite:
If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.
Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage
(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 266:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function `VIP180.decreaseAllowance` is infinite:
If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.
Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage
(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 266:4:

Constant/View/Pure functions:

`SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256)` : Is constant but potentially should not be.
[more](#)
Pos: 34:4:

Constant/View/Pure functions:

`SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256)` : Is constant but potentially should not be.
[more](#)
Pos: 91:4:

Constant/View/Pure functions:

`SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256)` : Is constant but potentially should not be.
[more](#)
Pos: 129:4:

Similar variable names:

VIP180_mint(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount".
Pos: 304:16:

Similar variable names:

VIP180_mint(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount".
Pos: 306:40:

Similar variable names:

VIP180_mint(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount".
Pos: 307:18:

Similar variable names:

VIP180_mint(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount".
Pos: 307:39:

Similar variable names:

VIP180_mint(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount".
Pos: 307:52:

Similar variable names:

VIP180_mint(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount".
Pos: 308:34:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 20:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 51:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 325:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 326:8:

Data truncated:

Division of integer values yields an integer value again. That means e.g. $10 / 100 = 0$ instead of 0.1 since the result is an integer again. This does not hold for division of (only) literal values since those yield rational constants.

Pos: 75:16:

Data truncated:

Division of integer values yields an integer value again. That means e.g. $10 / 100 = 0$ instead of 0.1 since the result is an integer again. This does not hold for division of (only) literal values since those yield rational constants.

Pos: 112:20:

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Solhint Linter

mvg.sol

```
contracts/MVG.sol:1:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.5.0 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

Software analysis result:

These software reported many false positive results and some are informational issues. So, those issues can be safely ignored.



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